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Turnout Decline & Public Opinion:

Abstract:
Voter turnout has declined precipitously during Latin
America's 25 year experience with representative democracy.
This decline has occurred in conjunction with another important
trend. Across the region, economic development directed by
state leaders and characterized by heavy state intervention has
been replaced by a development model, commonly referred to as
the Washington Consensus, in which markets are the preferred
instrument for growth and the state plays a minimal role. This
means that as people were casting off their undemocratic past,
their economies were also undergoing fundamental change.
This simultaneous turn to democratic governments and marketbased economic policy is commonly called Latin America's dual
transition. The twin transition gives rise to the basic research
question of this work: Is the dramatic decline in democratic
participation throughout Latin America somehow linked to the
political or economic consequences of market reform?

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Averal.le

First Election
{Year}
83.3 (83)
82 (85)
88.1 (89)
94.7 (89)
58.1 (74)
83.3 (70)
75.7 (74)
80.4 (79)
79 (84)
65 (85)
78 (81)
86.2 (90)
73.7 (94)
69 (93)
81.8 (80)
85.8 (84)
96.5 ~73)
80.0

Last Election
{Year}
76.1 (03)
66.8 (02)
73.7 (02)
87.2 (99)
45.6 (02)
67.1 (02)
79.1 (04)
56 (02)
67.3 (04)
52.9 (03)
63.2 (01)
76 (01)
75 (04)
62.3 (03)
70.4 (01)
89.5 (04)
56.5 ~01)
68.5

In order to proceed with an assessment of the proposed
relationship between market reform and declining turnout, we
must first establish that tum out is actually declining in the region
and demonstrate discontent with the dual transition process.
The raw turnout statistics for both presidential and legislative
elections provide compelling evidence that turnout is declining
in Latin America. During the democratic period, or the period
between a nation's first and last election cycle, average presidential
election turnout has declined more than 11 percent while turnout
in legislative elections has seen more than a 16 percent decrease.
(See Table 1)
The fact that 14 of the ~i 7 countries under consideration
have seen turnout declines of 10 percent or more in presidential
and/or legislative elections is striking but it is not conclusive. In

Difference
-7.2
-15.2
-14.4
-7.5
-12.5
-16.2
3.4
-24.4
-11.7
-12.1
-14.8
-10.2
1.3
-6.7
-11.4
3.7
-40
·11.5

First Election
{Year}
83.3 (83)
82 (85)
84.6 (90)
94.7 (89)
57.1 (74)
83.3 (70)
69.5 (86)
80.3 (79)
67.7 (88)
69.3 (85)
67.5 (81)
81 (90)
73.7 (94)
66.2 (93)
80.4 (80)
87.9 (84)
96.5F3l
77.9

Last Election
{Year}
61.7 (03)
66.8 (02)
75.9 (02)
75.6 (01)
38.7 (02)
66.1 (02)
49.1 (02)
56 (02)
·36.9 (03)
50.3 (03)
..60.4 (01)
76 (01)
76.9 (03)
: . 62.3 (03) '
. 62.7(01)
-· 89.5 (04)
. 38 ~00)
61.3

Difference
-21.6
-15.2
-8.7
-19.1
-18.4
-17.2
-20.4
-24.3
-30.8
-19
-7.1
-5
3.2.
-3.9
-17.7
1.6
-58.5.
-16.6

Data are from the electoral database of Dr. JeffRyan.
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order to determine whether these drop offs are statistically
significant, we need to conduct a difference of means or t-test.
The standard cutoff point fort -test significance in social science
research is .05 or better. (McClendon, 148) In our case, the null
hypothesis, that the observed changes in turnout levels are
insignificant in statistical terms, has a significance level of .008
for both legislative and presidential turnout decline. (See Table
2) This indicates a .8 percent chance that the shift in the mean is
the result of random variation or, alternatively, it shows a 99.2
percent chance that a nonrandom element or elements are causing
the decline in turnout. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected
with a high level of certainty .

Pair 1

Table 2: 01fference of Means Test for· Turnout Change
Shift in the Mean
Countries
-12.825
16
First Legislative .Election Turnout

Significance

0.008

Last Legislative Election T umout

Pair 2

·8.8975

First Presidential Election Turnout

16

0.008

Last Presidential Election Turnout

Data are from the electoral database of Dr. Jeff Ryan.

In order to determine a potential causal element that is
driving Latin America's turnout decline, I tum to data from an
annual region-wide poll. (Latinobarometro, 2002) The polling
data indicates that nearly 70 percent of Latin Americans are
neither contented with nor supportive of market reefrom. (See
Table 3) This means that economic development is moving in a
direction that is at odds with the will of the general populous.
This is a striking and seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon
within a representative democratic context. Given this, it is
certainly plausible to suggest that this regional macro-level trend
is associated with another, declining electoral participation. We
must now conceptualize the link between turnout decline and
economic reform.
Table 3: Attitudes Toward State Intervention in Econom
Country

Pro-Market

Undecided

Pro-State

82.3
1.5
16.3
72.9
3.9
23.2
60.6
5.1
34.4
80.1
2.5
17.4
72.5
5.3
22.2
70.7
4
25.4
79.8
1.7
18.4
60.6
2.8
36.7
60.1
4.4
35.5
58.6
6.2
35.2
67.8
3.8
28.4
72.4
Mexico
2.3
25.3
68.7
3.1
Nicaragua
28.2
67.9
2.7
Panama
29.5
1.9
68.8
Paraguay
29.3
Peru
28.2
5.2
66.7
10.8
2.4
86.8
Uruguay
3.2
60.8
Venezuela
35.9
26.7
3.4
69.9
Average
(Latinobarometro, 2002 in United Nations Development Program, 2004) A pro-market
.attitude indicates that poll respondents approve only of market-based development or have
a general pro-market tendency. A pro-state attitude indicates that respondents approve of
state-directed development have a general pro-state tendency.
Argentina
Bolivia,
·. Brazil.
·Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras

or

Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Market
Reform a~d Turnout Decline:
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There are two general ways of conceptualizing the impact
of neoliberal reforms on electoral participation. The first focuses
more narrowly on those tangible economic consequences of
these reforms which based on existing findings from the voting
literature can reasonably be expected to depress turnout. The
second looks at the wider impact of the reforms on the very
nature of policy decision-making within the region or, put
differently, the political consequences of the Washington
Consensus. The goal here is to link market reform to changes in
the political realm which can plausibly be tied to reduced
participation at the polls.

The Impact of Economic Consequences
Democracy places certain requirements on its citizenry
that other political systems do not. It requires, unlike nondemocratic systems, that individuals follow policy issues, track
the performance of elected representatives, participate in civil
society and perhaps most importantly, vote. The fulfillment of
these requirements takes resources such as time and money.
Research on voting patterns in the developed world has
consistently demonstrated that there is a positive relationship
between socioeconomic status and turnout at the individual
level. (Powell, 121) The inverse is also well-established in the
literature:
People with lower individual means (education,
income, experience) have fewer resources to cover the
costs of participation (processing the required
information, reaching a decision, finding the time to
vote). They are also more likely to develop apathetic
attitudes towards the political system, and thus are
more difficult for parties and institutions to motivate
to vote. As a result, they usually vote less. It has been
shown that participation increases with age (up until
a certain threshold), income and social integration.
(Anduiza, 647)
A core reason for this relationship rests in the unique
resource requirements of democratic citizenship. Individuals
must have the time, means, information, and policy knowledge
to engage leaders. They must have the wealth and organizational
capacity to engage civil society. Finally, they must have the
resources, stability, and information to cast an informed vote.
The bulk of the research on the link between socioeconomic
status and voting has focused on established industrial countries.
Much less attention has been given to this relationship in the
study of the developing democracies of Latin America. The
exception is a 2003 study by Canton and Jorrat who performed
an individual level socioeconomic analysis of voter turnout in
Argentine presidential elections from 1983-1999. (Canton &
Jorrat, 2003) Their findings confirmed trends found in research
on developed democracies: turnout was found to be directly
related to a person's economic wellbeing. Unfortunately,
individual level data on the scale required to replicate Canton and
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Jorrat's study for all of Latin America simply does not exist. We
must rely instead on broader measures at the macroeconomic
level which can at least give some indication of the relative size
of the pools of voters and non-voters based on socioeconomic
conditions. In other words, I assume that declines in
macroeconomic performance will push greater numbers of people
into lower socioeconomic status, making them less likely to vote
and thus driving down turnout at the aggregate level. Likewise,
positive macroeconomic performance should be linked to
increased voter participation.

collective action a logistical impossibility. Additionally, because
governments are engaged in a small and rapidly shrinking
amount of economic activity, labor mobilization against the state
beyond the ballot box (e.g., protests, strikes, etc.) has become a
largely useless endeavor. Thus, the Washington Consensus has
critically undermined the capacity of one of the most effective
vehicles for mobilization, organized labor, to fulfill its historic
function.

The Impact of Political Consequences

The impact of market reform on the political parties of
Latin America has been equally significant. The implementation
of the Washington Consensus has in many ways stripped parties
of the two primary mechanisms they have historically utilized to
mobilize voters: policy alternatives and tangible benefits. Prior
to marketization, parties enticed people to the polls by presenting
them with clear choices in the form of programmatic alternatives.
Though the cost of such intense ideological competition was
frequently polarization and.'occasionally serious violence, there
is no denying that parties in most countries in the region were
routinely able to project elections as high-stakes affairs in which
voters felt compelled to participate. Not so today, liberalization
and globalization have placed ever-increasing pressure on
governments, and by extension the parties which hope to control
them, to deliver policy options that are consistent with investor
expectations. Because of the enormous political and economic
risks associated with enacting (or even promising) policies in
conflict with the market model, party platforms have become
overwhelmingly inore responsive to investor expectations than
to popular demands.

The political consequences associated with the
implementation of the Washington Consensus are many. During
the period of statist development, the state controlled most
economic activity and had an array of policy options at its
disposal. Due to the shift toward market-based economic policy,
the state controls little economic activity and has lost its array of
policy options. The significance of this in terms of participation
is that it has undermined the most historically important
mobilizational and representative institutions in the region:
organized labor, political parties, and legislatures. At the heart of
this impact are the particular disincentives for both individual
and collective action that are associated with the neoliberal
model. As Kurtz notes,
[Market reforms] raise significant barriers to collective
political action and thus induce a decline in the
organizational and mobilizational capacity of civil
societyO[reforms] create collective action problems
that inhibit the formation of groups (or for that matter
the formation of collective interests) that are essential
antecedents of political participationOthey can also
reduce the scope of political decision making-that is,
the set of issues properly thought of as regulated by
public policy- which reduces the incentives for
individuals to engage in political activity. (Kurtz, 272)

Political Parties

Thus, beyond depressing individual motivation to
participate, Kurtz argues that the reforms have seriously
undermined those groups or institutions in society which might
mobilize otherwise apathetic citizens to go to the polls. In the
Latin American context, labor unions and political parties have
been the primary agents of mobilization.

The second key mobilizational mechanism used by parties
was based on their ability to reward their backers in tangible
ways. Preceding inarketization, the universal characteristic of
Latin American party systems \Yas patronage, "which entails an
exchange of material benefits for political support." (Roberts,
44) These benefits, took the forms of employment, favors,
contracts, or subsidies. In the neoliberal context of fiscal prudence
and ever-declining state activity, parties are increasingly less
able to deliver these material rewards. As a result, the entire logic
of the old system has effectively vanished, and with it, much of
the mobilizational capacity of parties.

Unions

Legislatures and Executives

The basis of the collective action problem with regard to
unions rests in labor market changes. Reforms have brought a
shift in labor market structure, heavily favoring non-union
sectors over the unionized sector. The traditional base, the
organized and politically active unionized sector, around which
mobilization of the working (or even peasant) classes would
occur has severely weakened. This fragmentation has made

At the beginning of the dual transition, there was a great
deal of concern that the drastic and difficult reforms called for by
the Washington Consensus would be virtually impossible to
carry out in a context of representative democracy. (Armijo et al.,
162-164) Agreement slowly emerged in the region that the only
way to overcome this challenge ,was to somehow insulate
economic policymaking from public d~:Ua~ds. This ultimately
led to the appearance of what Guillermo O'Donnell labeled
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"delegative democracy" throughout the hemisphere. (O'Donnell,
1994) This new "species" of democracy differs in fundamental
ways from classical representative democracy. In "delegative"
systems, presidential candidates feel no compelling need to
follow through on their campaign promises once elected to
office.
This means that presidents in such systems see themselves
not as representatives ofthe people (and therefore obliged to be
responsive to popular demand), but as leaders chosen to do what
they think is best for the country, even if it is in conflict with the
wishes of voters. In order to carry out this delegated mandate,
executives must effectively exclude not just the demands of the
public at large, but also of their elected representatives, the
legislators. (O'Donnell, 59-61) According to Lasagna and
Cardenal, this creates
... a vicious circle with pernicious consequences for
democracy. Presidents demand more power to govern
on the pretext that parties and legislatures are weak
institutions, but this accumulation of power, rather
than resolving the problem, further aggravates it,
weakening the key instruments society has for
enforcing accountability, further distancing citizens
from the public interest, and deteriorating democratic
life. (Lasagna & Cardenal 132)
As the legislature becomes less and less able to impact
public policy, citizens will naturally become less and less
concerned with who occupies its seats, and it is reasonable to
assume that turnout, especially for legislative elections, will
decline.
In sum, the basic assumption underlying the political
consequences hypothesis is that if unions are shrinking and
becoming marginalized, parties-are becoming programmatically
indistinguishable and unable,'to offer material rewards to their
backers, legislatures are largely sidestepped when it comes to
policymaking, and presidents enact policy based on technocratic
criteria rather than in response to popular demands, it is hardly
surprising that Latin American voters have concluded that voting
is largely a futile endeavor.

Overview of Descriptive Evidence:
Before moving on to a more detailed explanation and test
of my main hypotheses, it is appropriate to first take a broad
overview of economic and political conditions in Latin America
during the post-reform period to see whether there are indications
that the sorts of trends we described above are in fact present.

Economic Performance
In assessing the record of the Washington Consensus in
terms of economic performance to date, the best that can be said
is that the results are mixed. The biggest success of reform by far

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol6/iss1/8
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was the curbing of hyperinflation. Inflation rates dropped from
a staggering regional average of 1,152 percent in 1990 to average
rates of less than 20 percent by the late 1990s. (World Bank,
2004)
Consumer Price lndeJt
1200

-~------·-'

,..,

1980

L________________________________________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(World Bank. 2004) This graph displays the average regional inflation nte as measured by the change m the
consumer price index (CP1) from 1980..1996. CPl reflects price level changes of a basket of consumer goods.

Beyond this very significant triumph, market reforms have
generally not lived up to expectations. Real GOP growth has
been tepid at best. Despite showing an average growth rate of
around 3.9 percent over the 1990-1996 period, growth slowed to
an average 2.4 percent over the 1997-2002 period. More
significantly, creation of wealth is not keeping pace with the
population growth, as GOP per capita growth has lagged behind
real GOP growth by around two percent and has actually been
negative in three out of the last four years. (World Bank, 2004)
;---------------·-·-----·---------- -·-- ·-·----------·-Real Regional Gross Domestic Product lndlciltors

,

_

~-~-~~R~~~-----~~~~~~:~~:.:

_____._________

(~~idB~~-"2004)This gra~bru-;1~-;~~-~~.~~~~;;~~l-;~J~ domestic product and real gross
domestic prodw;t per capita grov.ih rates from 198()...2002.

Significantly, evidence suggests that this shortfall in growth
has been borne large! y by the lower income groups. The Estimated
Household Income Inequality index (EHII) indicates that
inequality has increased more than I 0 percent since the onset of
the debt crisis, a disturbing trend in a region already plagued by
some of the most unequal wealth distribution in the world.
(University of Texas Inequality Project, 2004)

: r=

,------------------- ---------------- --------------------Estim!1ed Household Income lneguatUy
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(University of Texas, 2004) Increasing regional esttmated household income ineq~ali_ty (EHli) indi~es indicate
increasing inequality. A score ofO l~dicates ~eel equal1ty ""hi i.e a sco~e of tOO tndJca.tes perfect mequal1ty. Tile
EHII index. is calculated using combmed stansucs on both wage mequahty and ecooonuc resource control.
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Finally, reforms have failed to create jobs. The regional
unemployment rate has risen from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 9.5
percent in 2002, reaching double digits from 1999-2001. (World
Bank, 2004)
It seems clear, then, that in most regards the market reforms
at the heart of the dual transition have thus far not lived up to
expectations. Of course, there are many reasons behind this
suboptimal performance, some of which are undoubted! y beyond
the control of Latin American policymakers. From a political
perspective, though, these reasons may be irrelevant, for as
Kurtz notes, "if neoliberal [market] policies are not causally
responsible for Latin America's economic problems, the political
fact remains that they have become associated with them in the
popular mind." (287)

As the size of the formal sector has declined, its
mobilizational ability has been undermined. One way to measure
union mobilization is in terms of strike and lockout rates, which
give some indication of how active the organized labor sector is.
The data show that labor action is increasingly less likely. The
average yearly regional strike rate has declined from a high of
310 during the 1985-1989 period to 113 during the 2000-2003
period. (See Table 5) The assertion is that the decline in strike
rates does not reflect satisfaction (in light of increased
unemployment and 1nequality with lagging GDP per capita
growth) with Washington Consensus economic policy, but rather,
it reflects an incapacitated organizational ability caused by labor
market changes

Political Peifonnance
It is, of course, much more difficult to assess the political
impact of the reform era. Nonetheless, there are indications that
the sort of damaging consequences of neoliberalism on
mobilizational institutions described earlier are indeed present
in the region.
In assessing the record of the Washington Consensus in
terms of political performance, the results are grim. The dual
transition period has witnessed the flexibilization and
informalization of the economy. Evidence demonstrates that the
unionized, politically-influential formal employment sector is
shrinking. During the 1990-2002 period, this focal point of
political organization diminished by more than five percent. (See
Table 4)

Country

The impact of neoliberal reform on representative
institutions transcends labor unions. Political parties, legislatures,
and executives have also lost significant ground in terms of
public opinion. Polling data indicates that average regional
confidence in these institutions has declined 10, 12, and two
percent respectively since 1997. (See Table 6) In a region of
ideological uni-polarity, fiscal limitation, technocratic policymaking, and unresponsive leadership, citizens now view those
institutions which once represented their interests as no longer
effective
The loss of credibility of representative institutions is
linked to the perception that these institutions have surrendered
their traditional power and policy influence during the reform
era, particularly to the private business sector. When asked who
wielded the most power in their respective countries, more
people identified big business as the most powerful sector than

1990-1994

1995-1999

Argentina
Brazil

48.0

Chile

62.1
54.3
58.8
44.4

50.7
54.9
61.2
56.7
36.3

42.4

41.1

64.0

62.9
"41.9
44.6
58.7
55.5

Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador

59.4

2000-2002

-55.5
54.0
,,,62.0
44.4 55.0
46.7
48.2
34.9
45.6
60:1
'39.1
42.3
57.8
48.5

-

El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru

Venezuela

47.3
60.9
61.4

Region~! Average

54.8

Uruguay

51.3 _ _

__

.

_49.6

~.Intema~onal Labor. Or~anizati~n, 2003) Figures indicate the average percentage of the total labor force which is
formal for_ the per:od m quesn~n. Formal laborers normally work under contract, enjoy employer benefits, and

have a working envrronment subJect to state regulation.
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Count!Y_
Argentina
Bolivia

1980- 1984

1985-1989

1990-1994

1995-1999

2000-2003

273
226
56
183

431
211
2067
67
123
15

51
883
213
320
22

81
800
156

396
105

Brazil

Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Venezuela

22

49

12
2
11
155
12
58
8

64
104
25
40
28
24
18
63
53
36
0
65
47
8
12
47
75
293
686
714
31
18
7
36
113
143
113
177
310
155
Re~ional Avera~e
(International Labor Organization, 2005) A strike or lockout is generally defined as an occurrence that causes the
disruption of enterprise activity, though different nations adopt specific variations ~fthis defmition.

Institution
Political Parties
legislatures

91
22
14
38

1997

1998

1999-2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Change

28
14
11
21
20
19
18
-10
36
27
23
28
24
17
24
-12
Presidents
39
38
39
30
31
37
-2
(Latinobarometro, 2004) Figures indicate the percentage of poll respondents who expressed some confidence,
confidence, or strong confidence in these institutions.

Count!Y_
Argentina
Bolivia
Brasil

Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru

Business
70.38
34.26
42.24
68.49
47.02
38.42
46.75
47.30
29.49
42.90
36.75
45.50
32.20
33.09
42.01
28.69

The State
11.66
36.93
24.00
12.50
13.05
45.17
15.67
36.05
45.92
34.01
41.76
19.01
35.59
33.50
43.01
34.33

Political Parties
12.87
21.85
14.22
3.04
10.95
16.41
12.64
6.54
7.83
11.24
12.14
16.38
15.68
2.96
10.07
9.48

Uruguay
Venezuela
30.14
11.52
Average
42.84
(Latinobarometro, 2002 in United Nations Development Program, 2004) The figures represent response to the
question, "In your opinion, which of the following has the most power in this country?"
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those citing the state and political parties combined. (See Table
7) If, indeed, most citizens feel that their governments and parties
are more or less inconsequential relative to private economic
interests, then what incentive is there to vote?

Modeling Voter Turnout in Latin America:
At this point, I have shown the significance of the
turnout decline, reported opinion data on discontent, provided
some conceptual justification for my hypothesized link between
market reform and that decline, and supplied some preliminary
descriptive evidence that indicates the presence of the trends I
suggested are at work. I now turn to a more rigorous test of my
two hypotheses, which in specific form are the following:

Hypothesis One: Declines in socioeconomic conditions
resulting/rom the implementation ofmarket refonns will produce
declines in electoral turnout.
Hypothesis Two: Declines in the strength, effectiveness,
and performance of the major mobilizational institutions (i.e.,
unions, parties and legislatures) resulting from the
implementation of market refonns will produce declines in
electoral turnout.
Both of the major hypotheses have a number of subhypotheses, which are essentially single indicator linear
relationships between various independent variables to our
dependent variable, voter turnout. These are:

ECONOMIC

POLITICAL

Real GOP per Capita
Inflation
Inequality
Unemployment
Privatization
Trade Liberalization
Labor
Financial Liberalization
Consumption Taxation
Overall Structural Reform

Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative

Voter Turnout
The dependent variable in the regression model is voter
turnout. The model independently considers turnout in two types
of elections: legislative and presidential. The data include results
from 17 Latin American nations covering democratic elections
from 1980-2003. Turnout has been tabulated for 78 presidential
elections and 85 legislative elections. In this analysis, turnout is
defined as the percentage of registered voters who cast valid
votes. The data are from a compilation of electoral statistics
developed by Dr. Jeff Ryan using official government sources.
A full listing of the original sources is available in the Turnout
Reference Appendix.

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2005

Economic Hypothesis Variables.
Most comparative political research, especially that dealing
with the developing world, is limited by the availability and
reliability of necessary data. Nonetheless, the economic variables
for which I have been able to gather sufficient data should
provide a reasonably good test of my hypotheses.

Percent Change in Real GDP per Capita measures the
ability of an economy to generate wealth in real terms relative to
the population size. The coverage of this variable is 1979-2002.
Inflation measures the rate at which prices are increasing:
and is a measure of overall economic stability. The consumer •
price index (CPI) will be used as the inflation measure in this .·
research. This shows the rate at which prices of basic consumer
goods are increasing on an annual basis. The coverage of CPI is
from 1979-2002.
Inequality is an indicator of the distribution of resources
within a nation. The Estimated Household Income Inequillity
(EHII) index will be used as the measure. This index combines
inequality data on wages and pay with that of absolute resource >
control. (Galbraith & Kum, 2004) This means that it can account :.
for the disparity in earning between low-wage workers and highincome salary employees while simultaneously considering the
relative differences in net assets among various holders. A score
of zero indicates perfect equality while a score of 100 indicates ·. ·
perfect inequality. The coverage of the EHII index is 1979-1999.
Rate of Total· Unemployment measures the percentage of
the active laborforcethat is unable to obtain employment. The
coverage of unemployme11t statistics is 1980-2002.
PoliticalHypothesis Variables
The proble~sof data availability for political variables are
even more pronounced than for economic variables. As a result,
I was forced inste;d to rely on an indirect test of this hypothesis
using proxy indicators for the relationships I described earlier.
Specifically, I will use measures of the reform itself, rather than
of the impact of that reform. These variables take the form of a
series of indices constructed by Eduardo Lora of the InterAmerican Development Bank to measure the extent of reform in
each of five particular areas, as well as a composite index
measuring overall structural reform. Lora's dataset covers all of
the countries in Latin America included in my analysis from
1985-1999.

Privatization Index is calculated a~ the ratio of the
cumulative value of privatization to total GDP for the year in
question. (Lora, 21) This indicator is not an ideal measure of state
industrial involvem~nt, as it penalizes thos~ ~ations with nothing
to privatize or that retain profitable industry
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Trade Reform Index is the average of the average level and
dispersion of tariffs. (Lora, 20) It is reasonable to assert that as
tariff levels and dispersion have changed, the level of overall
government involvement in regulating trade has changed with it.
Labor Reform Index has four components. They are level
of flexibility for hiring workers, the cost oflayoffs or termination,
cost of overtime and holiday employment, and required
contributions to benefit plans. (Lora, 21)
Domestic Financial Reform Index is the average of three
indices. The first measures the level of government control over
bank borrowing and lending interest rates. The second is the
reserves to demand deposits ratio. The final is the quality of
government intervention in the financial system. (Lora, 20)
Tax Reform Index is composed of five parts. It combines
measures of the highest marginal tax rate for both individuals and
corporations, the value added tax (VAT) rate, and the efficiency
of VAT and income tax collection. (Lora, 21) The index displays
the movement from progressive taxation on income to regressive
taxation on consumption. The shift is one of government policy.
It does not indicate a withdrawal of the state but a redirection that
is a direct consequence of market reform.
General Structural Reform Index is the simple average of
the previous five indices for the year in question. (Lora, 19)
While it is unlikely that each dimension of this index contributes
equally to the economic and policy consequences of reform, it is
the only aggregate measure available. It can be used to gauge
voters' general response to reform rather than to specific policy
areas.

and applicability to modeling voter turnout in Latin America.
First, all independent variables have been lagged one year. This
is because individuals need time to process and react to economic
and political changes. Second, indicator, or dummy, variables
have been included. These variables detect the significance of
unmeasured qualitative or quantitative effects which cause
variation in the dependent variable. They measure the importance
of things other than the previously described independent
variables. The inclusion of dummy variables has been specified
for country specific effects and/or time effects. By lagging the
independent variables and including the dummy variables, I
hope to produce a more comprehensive and robust picture of
electoral turnout.
Using these basic specifications, I then estimated a series
of models designed to test a broad array of different combinations
of the various hypothesized relationships described above. For
each of these combinations, models were estimated separately
for presidential and legislative elections. For both of the main
hypotheses, I tested each of the specified independent variables
(economic and political) alone and in all possible combinations
with each other, as well as in combination with the country and
time dummy variables. I then estimated a "kitchen sink" model
which included both economic and political variables (as well as
the dummies.)

Results and Analysis:
Presidential Turnout

E!
E2
E3

Model Specification

GOP
Inflation

GOP
Inflation

.. Multiple regression analysis provides the most suitable
framework for testing my hypotheses. However, in its basic
form, it.has a fundamental limitation. It can consider only one
cross sectional unit at time. In the current research, a cross
section is a Latin American country. Because we consider
multiple countries or cross sections simultaneously, a variation
on standard regression analysis is required. The most appropriate
technique under these conditions is cross-sectional time series
regression, which uses traditional multiple regression to calculate
the proper

a

B value for each independent variable in each cross section.
It then takes the summation of the calculations in order to
determine the proper B values when all cross sections are
considered simultaneously. (SAS Institute, 2005) Thus, when
considering changes in the dependent variable, cross-sectional
time series analysis indicates the explanatory capacity of each
independent variable considered over all countries.

Two specifications have been made to the basic crosssectional time series regression model to improve its accuracy
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ES
E6
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
KS1

Inequality
Unemployment

Prtvatizat1on Index
Trade Reform Index
Labor Reform Index
Financial Reform Index
Tax Reform Index
General Reform Index
General Reform fndex

GOP
InflatiOn

0.1999

05052
0.00199
0.816
0.0038
.080972
1.7382
-7.95575
-13.0354
-13.1002
·12.5601
-32.5733
-26.047
-31.69

0.0837
0.2002
0.009
0.019
0.3695
0.2608
0.1682
0.009
0.6605
0.0207
0.0195
0.0058
0.005

-0 00084

0.6612

0.891
0.888
0.906
0.915
0.968
0.9
0.916
0.894
0.911
0.911
0.918
0.921

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

0.5143

Stat!'itlcal !.l£nlflcan~c 1s cstubltshcd at aPr value of 05 or ~c . . ~
•tnchcatc:s thai Ihe dummy \'ariablc ~as mdudcd m lhc model RC'sol!s are suppre~~.

The model of presidential election voter turnout in Latin
America revealed minor support for economic indicator variables
in isolation from one another. The test results demonstrate that
the interaction between real GOP per capita and inflation has a
statistically significant impact on turnout. A one percent decline
in real GOP per capita will cause a .82 percent decline in voter
turnout. This is the direct relationship anticipated by the economic
consequence hypothesis. Inflation also produces a significant
result, but in an unexpected direction. A one percent decline in
inflation will cause a .004 percent decline in voter turnout. The
economic consequence hypothesis expectation was that increases
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in inflation would cause decreases in turnout. On the basis of
these conflicting results and absent support for other economic
variables, the economic consequence hypothesis is rejected for
presidential elections.
The voter turnout model revealed robust support for political
consequence variables in isolation. When tested independently,
the trade, financial, and tax reform indices all achieved high
levels of statistical significance and caused voter turnout to
change in the direction anticipated by the political consequence
hypothesis. As reform increased, turnout declined. When the
indices were tested simultaneously, however, they were found to
display mutlicollinearity, meaning they explain the same variation
in the dependent variable and share the statistical significance of
each independent variable in isolation. (Billingsley, et al., 681)
This suggested that the overall reform process may be more
important than any single aspect of reform. To explore this
possibility, a model using only the aggregate general reform
index was estimated. It achieved a high level of statistical
significance. An increase of 0.1 in the general reform index was
found to cause a 2.6 percent decline in turnout. On the basis of
these findings, the political consequence hypothesis is accepted
for presidential elections.
The model of voter turnout revealed no support for the
importance of the interaction between economic indicator and
political indicator variables, or the "kitchen sink" model. This
suggests that the previous findings represent the proper
explanation of the decline in voter turnout for presidential
elections. Turnout is primarily a function of the political
consequences of market reform.

Legislative Turnout

E1

GOP

E2

Inflation
Inequality
Unemployment

E3
E4
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
KS1

Privatization Index

Trade Reform Index
labor Reform Index
Financial Reform Index
Tax Reform Index
General Reform Index
General Reform Index

0.647
0.64546
0.00117
·1.2319
.0.2831
·14.6023
-23.4531
-44.6943
-19.0428
-59.155
-47.9488
-58.5895

GOP

0.009
0.5232
0.176
0.5267
0.1103
0.0027
0.319
0.0113
0.001
00007
0.0002
().()767

0.93
0.7022
0.9422
0.9307
0.8034
0.8377
0.794
0.8248
0.8447
0.6493
0.8631

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

Statisucal stgmficance IS established at aPr \'alue of .05 or Jess.

•Indicates that the dummy "ariable was included in the modeL Results are supprtssed.

The model of legislative election voter turnout in Latin
America revealed minor support for economic indicator variables
in isolation. The test results demonstrate that real GDP per capita
has a statistically significant impact on turnout. A one percent
decline in real GDP per capita will cause a .65 percent decline in
voter turnout. This direct relationship is anticipated by the
economic consequence hypothesis. However, the failure of the
other economic indicator variables to achieve significance casts
doubt on the original economic consequence hypothesis. This
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hypothesis can only be accepted in modified form for legislative
elections: as real GDP per capita declines, voter turnout will
decline.
The voter turnout model revealed considerable support for
political indicator variables in isolation. When tested
independently, the trade, financial, and tax reform indices were
statistically significant and had the inverse relationship to voter
turnout anticipated by the political consequence hypothesis.
Consistent with the finding for presidential turnout, the individual
reform indices were found to display mutlicollinearity. When the
general reform index was tested, it was robustly significant. An
increase of .1 in the general reform index was found to cause a
4. 7 percent decline in turnout. On the basis of these findings, the
political consequence hypothesis is accepted for legislative
elections.
The model of voter turnout in Latin America revealed no
support for the importance of the interaction between economic
indicator and political indicator variables. This suggests that the
previous findings represent the proper explanation of voter
turnout decline for legislative elections. It is principally a function
of the political consequences of market reform but real GDP per
capita also has explanatory capacity.

Discussion of Results:
The previous. section analyzed the results of the model of
voter turnout in Latin America according to their application to··
either presidential. or legislative elections. This section will
merge those finding in order to explore the model results as they
apply to each of the hypotheses. By doing this, broad trends in
voter turnout can be determined and the applicability, or lack
thereof, of each hypothesis can be analyzed. The analysis of each
hypothesis will proceed in two steps. First, the independent
variables that achieved significance across both presidential and
legislative elections will be evaluated. Second, those independent
variables that failed to achieve significance will be explored. By
merging the results from presidential and legislative elections, a
vision of the for~es that drive voter turnout in Latin America will
emerge.

Economic Consequence Hypothesis: Economic Deterioration
--Turnout Decline
The assertion that economic underpeiformance is driving
the decline in voter turnout iri Latin America found little support ·.·
in eitherpresideritial legislative elections. The only independent
variable to achieve statistical significance in each election type.
was real GDP per caplta. In som~ ways, the fact that this variable
was the only one which achieved significance does more to ,
undermine the economic hypothesis than to bolster it. Recall that
this hypothesis was derived from the voting literature that linked
an individual's socioeconomic status to turnout. My assumption

or
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was that macroeconomic changes in each of the four variables
would either expand or shrink the pool of people in the traditional
'non-voting' categories and thus shape overall turnout. Yet
among these four variables, GDP per capita is clearly the
weakest indicator in this regard, since it tells us very little about
who is suffering or prospering during periods of growth or
contraction. The strongest indicator, based on the assumptions
underlying the economic hypothesis, would clearly be
unemployment, followed by the more intermediate strength of
inflation and inequality variables.
The failure of unemployment, inflation, and inequality to
achieve statistical significance in both election types thus severely
weakens the economic consequence hypothesis. It is possible, of
course, that my inability to uncover a relationship between
economic performance and electoral partiCipation is due to the
lack of more appropriate data. Nonetheless, the findings remain
puzzling, particularly the lack of significance for unemployment.
One would expect that high and chronic unemployment rates
would create a substantial pool of poor, marginalized citizens
who would withdraw from the political arena. A possible
explanation for the weakness of this variable, though by no
means a strong one, is that the relationship between unemployment
and turnout is non-linear, where initial rises in joblessness
actually produce more political activity which then drops off as
time goes by and hopelessness sets in.
Something similar may be going on with inflation as well.
Following years of hyperinflation, Latin Americans may well
have developed a substantially higher tolerance threshold for
variations in the consumer price index. The enormous variation
in the values of this indicator, which"range from roughly -2
percent to· nearly 12,000 percent, may, also be an important
reason for the lack of significant findings. Meanwhile, inequality
may have failed to achieve significance due either to a similar
regional tolerance for high inequality orllecause changes in the
concentration of wealth are difficult for ordinary people to
discern. T<!ken as a whole,then: the findings call into serious
question the importance of economic performance as a driver of
voter turnout in Latin America. · ·
.' ' ·
Political Consequence Hypothesis: Political Impact of
Refonn--Turnout Decline
The hypothesis that the political impact of market reform
is driving the decline in voter turnout in Latin America found
robust support in both presidential and legislative elections. The
trade, financial, tax and general structural reform indices were all
significant across both election types: The significance of the tax
reform index indicates that as the preferred method of taxation
has shifted from income and trade to consumption, turnout has
declined. Recall that consumption taxation often assumes a
regressi~e character as ·lower in~orrie groups devote a higher
\~
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percentage of their income to consumption than higher income
groups.
The findings of significance for both the trade and financial
liberalization indices are also consistent with the assumptions
underlying the political hypothesis. As the state has surrendered
more and more control over the trading and financial sectors to
private market forces, it has become less and less relevant in
policymaking terms. In sharp contrast to the statist era, the
decisions which effect citizens most directly are now more or
less made outside the political arena, rendering participation in
elections a less meaningful activity. Though these indicators are,
as noted earlier, only indirect measures of the political
consequences of market reform, it seems more plausible to
assume that it is those consequences that people are responding
to rather than the reforms themselves. It is difficult to imagine,
for example, that Bolivian peasants and Honduran slum-dwellers
base their decision to vote on adjustments to the reserves to
demand deposits ratio.
Further support is indicated by the significance of the
general structural reform index across both presidential and
legislative elections. As the reform process has proceeded and
the activities of government have declined, turnout has declined
with it. Again, it seems very unlikely that any but the most
sophisticated citizens are directly linking their turnout decision
to the complex array of reform measures captured by the index.
The failure of the privatization and labor reform indices to
achieve statistical significance in either presidential or legislative
elections would seem, at first glance, to weaken the validity of
the political consequence hypothesis. However, the lack of
significance is more likely a function of how these indices are
calculated by Lora than of a lack of an underlying relationship.
Recall that the privatization index reflects the ratio of the
cumulative value of privatization to total GDP for the year in
question. This method produces some paradoxical and rather
contradictory results, particularly from the perspective of this
analysis. Specifically, it yields scores which have virtually
nothing to do with the percentage of the national economy held
directly by the state. A low score could, for example, indicate a
state which had divested itself of unprofitable holdings but
retained control of valuable assets, or a state which entered into
the reform period with very little if anything to privatize in the
first place. In other words, economies which were already
overwhelmingly private at the onset of the Washington Consensus
are effectively lumped in with economies which have failed to
follow through on the privatization agenda. If we are to accurately
measure the impact of privatization on turnout, it is clear that an
alternative measure is needed.
Like the privatization index, the lack of significance of the
labor reform index does not necessarily damage the validity of
the political consequence hypothesis. The index relies on legal
regulations about working conditions, pay, and termination.
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There are a number of problems with this approach. One is that
it does not consider enforcement of these regulations, which can
vary dramatically. Another is that such regulations only relate to
the formal sector, which as we have seen, accounts for a shrinking
proportion of the overall labor force in many countries. Finally,
in statistical terms, this index has shown the least variation
(across countries and across time) of any of the reform measures.
Because these scores are virtually flat for nearly every country
throughout the entire time span, it is next to impossible for them
to register significantly in any regression model.
On the basis of this model's explanatory capacity, then, the
hypothesis that the political impact of Washington Consensus is
driving the observed decline in voter turnout in Latin America is
accepted.

Conclusion:
The political consequences of Latin America's dual
transition have clearly been profound. Throughout the region,
powerful unions stand crippled, political parties are seemingly
adrift, legislatures appear increasingly less able to fulfill their
representational function, and executives are growing more
unaccountable and insulated.
In the current geopolitical climate, governments in Latin
America confront a harsh reality. Even moderate deviations
from the reforms embodied in the Washington Consensus are
met with serious reactions from the international system. Yet as
they conform to the standards of that system, they may be
undermining the very foundation of democratic governance. The
danger lies in the possibility that traditional forms of political
participation, like voting, may give way to more disruptive
participatory mechanisms. For while it is obviously possible for
elected civilian governments to oversee the painful transition
from statist to market economies, it is by no means certain that
they can do so without disrupting the very fabric of democratic
rule: electoral participation.

References:
Anduiza Perea, Eva (2002) 'Individual characteristics, institutional
incentives and electoral abstention in Western Europe.' European Journal
of Political Research 41: 643-{)73.
Billingsley, Patrick, D. James Croft, David V. Huntsberger, and Collin
J. Watson (1993) Statisticsfor Management and Economics. Needham Heights,
MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Canton, Dario and Jorge Raul Jorrat (2003) 'Abstention in Argentine
Presidential Elections, 1983-1999.' Latin American Research Review 38
(1): 187-2002.
Galbraith, James K. and Hyunsub Kum (2004) 'Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the Creation of
a Dense and Consistent Global Dataset.' Presentation prepared for the
International Association for Research on Income and Wealth, August
23.
International Labor Organization (2003) 2003 Labour Overview: Latin
America & the Caribbean. Lima, Peru: International Labor Organization.
- (2005) Laborstat Internet. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labor

Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2005

·
Organization. http://laborsta.ilo.org
Kurtz, Marcus J. (2004) 'The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open
Economy: Lessons from Latin America.' World Politics 56 Oanuary): 262302.
Lasagna, Marcelo and Ana Sofia Cardenal (1998) 'Desarrollo y Reforma
PoliticaenAmErica Latina: La Agenda Pendiente.' bzstituciones y Desarrollo
1: http://www.iigov.org/pnud/revista/previstal.htrn.
'
Latinobarometro Polling Corporation (2002) Santiago, Chile: http://
latinobarometro.org/.
·'
- (2004). 'Public Data.' Santiago, Chile: http: //latinobarometro.org/
Lora, Eduardo (2001) 'Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has
Been Reformed and How to Measure it.' Working Paper #466. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
McClendon, McKee J. (2002) Multiple Regression and Causal Analysis.
Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo {1994) 'Delegative Democracy.' Journal of Democracy 5: 55-69.
Payne, J. Mark, et. al. (2002) "Democracies in Development: Politics
and Reform in Latin America." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
.
Powell, G. Bingham (1982) Contemporary Denzocracies: Participation,
Stability and Violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roberts, Kenneth M. (2003) 'Social Correlates of Party System Demise
and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela.' Latin American Politics and Society
45{3): 35-57.
SAS Institute (2005) 'Overview: Time Series Cross Section Regression.' http://www.sas.com/
·
Transparency International (2004) Corruption Perception Index. Berlin,
Germany: http://www.transperancy.org/cpi/.
United Nations Development Program (2004) La Democracia en America
Latina: Hacia una Democracia Ciudadanas y Ciudadmzos. Buenos Aires,
Argentina: United Nations.
University of Texas Inequality Project (2004) Estimated Household
Income Inequality Index. Austin: University of Texas.
World Bank (2004) World Development Indicators CO-Rom. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Turnout Reference Appendix: Voter Turnout
Special thanks must be extended to Dr. Jeff Ryan of the
University of Arkansas for access· to his database of Latin
American voter turnout. The followingare the sources used in
the construction of his database.
Compilation· Sources:
Institute foi Democracy'& Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout from:
1945 tot 1998: A Global Report on .Political Participation. h11J2;11
www.idea.int/voter turnout/index.html
Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH). (1995). Partidos
y Clase Politica en America Laitna en los 90, San Jose, Costa Rica: lnstituto
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos.
Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH). (1998).
Elecciones y Democracia en America Latina, 1992-1996: Urnas y Desencanto
Politico. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos.
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). Election Guide.
http:// www.ifes.org/ eguide/ elecguide.htrn·.
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Official Government Sources
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Columbia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Panama

Camara Nacional Electoral
Corte Nacional Electoral
Tnbunal Superior Eleitoral
Ministerio del Interior
Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil
Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones
Junta Central Electoral
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral
Tnbunal Supremo Electoral
Consejo Supremo Electoral
Tribunal Electoral de Panama

Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela

Tnbunal Superior de Justicia Electoral
Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorates
Consejo Nacional Electoral

Faculty comment:
In his letter to the Inquiry publication board supporting the
publication of Mr. Younger's paper, Professor Jeffrey Ryan
made the following remarks:
Ryan's research project, which was funded in part
through a SURF grant, is without question one of the
most ambitious, well-crafted and innovative that I
have supervised during my fifteen years at the
university, including the half-dozen Masters theses I
have directed. It focuses on a topic that I have been
grapplingwithforanumberofyears-therelationship
between :macroeconomic structural reform and
democratic participation in Latin America. The
question is driven by a puzzling and • ~isturbing
observation: the widespread adoption of market
reforms has coincided with a aramatic decline in
voter turnout in the region.
Despite the obvious importance of this trend for
democratic consolidation in the hemisphere,
surprisingly little literature exists on the topic. This is,
I suspect, due in part to a central challenge confronting
researchers trying to assess the relationship.
Specifically, how is it possible to disaggregate the
economic consequences of market reform from the
political consequences of those reforms? Put
differently, there are plausible reasons for suspecting
that the socioeconomic "pain" caused by structural
adjustment (e.g., unemployment, poverty, inequality,
etc.) will depress turnout. There are equally persuasive
reasons to assume that the political effects of this
rapid macroeconomic transition, especially on
representative institutions like labor. ';lnions and
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http://www.pin.gov.ar/cne/
http://www.bolivian.com/cne/
http://www.tse.gov.br/
http://www.elecciones.gov.cll
http://www.registraduria.gov.co/
http://www.tse.go.cr/
http://www.jce.do/jce/
http://tse.satnet.net/tse/
http://www.tse.gob.sv/
http://www.tse.org.gt/
http://www.cse.gob.ni/
http://www.tribunalelectoral.gob.pa/
http://www.tsje.org.py/
http://www.onpe.gob.pe/
http://www.cne.gov. ve/
political parties, may result in a drop in voter
participation. Since both occur simultaneously, the
daunting task facing researchers is how to determine
if one or the other (or neither) is actually related to
rising abstentionism.
I must confess that! was both surprised and impressed
with the straightforward and even elegant solution
that Ryan proposed to a problem that has left
researchers (including myself) struggling. He first
provided a sound conceptual justification for
considering the two types of consequences separately.
This justification was rooted squarely in the traditional
literature on voting as well as the emerging literature
on the political impact of neoliberalism. He then went
on to devise an operationalization scheme which
would enable him to transform those concepts into
measurable variables. The next step was the arduous
collection and compilation of the necessary data, which
I know from experience, is no small feat when dealing
with the developing world. Finally, he consulted a
number of faculty on campus as well as the literature
to determine the most appropriate statistical
methodology for carrying out a rigorous test of his
hypotheses. In this endeavor, I must confess, he was
largely on his own, as the method he ultimately
settled on, cross-sectional time series regression
analysis, lies far beyond my zone of competence.
His findings are troubling. His analysis indicates that
it is not the economic shortcomings of market reform
(whichcanpresumablybecorrected)whicharedriving
people from the polls, but the far more pernicious
impact those reforms have had on the groups which
have historically mobilized citizens to participate.
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The implications of these findings are profound not
only in a research sense, but also in terms of the
quality of democratic life in Latin America and other
regions undergoing wholesale reform.
This thesis represents in a very real way the
culmination of Ryan's undergraduate experience here
at the University of Arkansas. Ryan is one of a handful
of students I have had in the course of my fifteen year
teaching career who balances all the most desirable
traits we hope to see in a young scholar. He is
intellectually curious, confident but not cocky,
disciplined, responsible and exceptionally intelligent.
In and out of class, Ryan has consistently exhibited a
genuine interest in learning. This curiosity extends
well beyond the "Hill." As you can see from his
record, Ryan recently spent an academic semester
studying in Cuba. Having spent a short time there, I
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can assure you that navigating Cuban society is
challenging in nearly every sense, from going about
routine daily necessities like eating and getting around
to dealing with people whose perceptions of and
attitudes towards US citizens are complex, to say the
least. That Ryan was not only able to survive, but
thrive in these conditions is clear evidence of his
ability and eagerness to transform any situation,
regardless of how difficult, into a positive learning
experience.
My role in Ryan's project has been much more that of
sounding board, of co-enthusiast, of listening partner
than that of supervisor. This project is, in every sense
of the word, a result of his hard work, his insights and
his passion for learning. I am just grateful that I was
along for the very rewarding ride.
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